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Does Compensation Disclosure Lead to Better Job Performance?  
Evidence from the Mandatory CFO Pay Disclosure 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2006 SEC rule, by changing the definition of Named Executive Officers, for the first time 
mandated the disclosure of CFO compensation. We exploit this setting and use a difference-in-
differences research design to study the impact of CFO compensation disclosure on CFO job 
performance. We hypothesize that the disclosure of CFO compensation information, by facilitating 
shareholder monitoring of the board and motivating the board to improve CFO compensation 
contract design, leads to better CFO job performance in providing high-quality financial reports. 
Analyses support our prediction: The treatment firms, which, under the 2006 rule, start to disclose 
CFO compensation information, compared to the control firms, which were already disclosing 
CFO compensation prior to 2006, experience a significant improvement in financial report quality 
as exhibited in the reduced frequency of both accounting restatements and internal control 
weaknesses, as well as improved accrual quality. Further strengthening our conclusion, the 
improvement in CFO performance in financial reporting for the treatment firms is more 
pronounced for firms with younger CFOs, firms with CFOs subject to weaker internal monitoring, 
and firms facing higher litigation risk. We contribute to the disclosure literature by showing a 
causal impact of compensation disclosure on job performance. Our findings also have regulatory 
implications. 
 
Keywords: SEC compensation disclosure mandate, accounting restatement, internal control 
quality, CFO performance. 
 
JEL classification: M41. 
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1. Introduction 
Compensation contract is a primary tool to incentivize managers to act in the shareholders’ 
interest. Due to the dispersed ownership, a single shareholder may not be willing to incur the costs 
on its own to monitor and negotiate with managers as the benefits can be enjoyed by all 
shareholders. As a result, corporate boards are designated by the shareholders to design and 
enforce such contracts. However, even the board has agency conflict with shareholders because 
the board may be dominated or influenced by managers to design poorly incentivized contracts 
that enable managers to extract rent. These concerns motivate the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to mandate the disclosure of management compensation as early as the Great 
Depression (Murphy, 2013) with the rationale that greater transparency and public oversight can 
mitigate the agency conflict between the board and shareholders. Despite the sound motivation, 
there lacks empirical evidence on whether compensation disclosure can improve compensation 
contracts for managers and in turn result in better job performance of managers.  
This paper exploits the setting of the 2006 SEC rule, which for the first time mandated the 
disclosure of CFOs’ (chief financial officers’) compensation for all firms, and examines the causal 
impact of CFO compensation disclosure on CFO’s job performance. Both before and since the 
2006 rule, the SEC has been requiring firms to disclose compensation-related information for all 
Named Executive Officers (NEOs), but the 2006 rule changed the definition of NEOs from 
including the chief executive officer (CEO hereafter) and the four other most highly compensated 
executive officers to including the CEO, the CFO, and the three other most highly compensated 
executive officers. Thus, this change in the 2006 rule has a differential effect on two groups of 
firms: The firms that were already disclosing compensation-related information for CFOs before 
2006 (control firms) continue to do so, and the firms that were not disclosing compensation-related 
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information for CFOs before 2006 (treatment firms) are now required to.1 This setting allows a 
clear identification of the causal impact of the disclosure of CFO compensation information on 
the treatment firms, using the control firms as a benchmark.2 By focusing on CFOs, some of 
whose compensation is for the first time being disclosed, we can address the causal question of 
whether compensation disclosure affects job performance. 
Conceptually, the disclosure of compensation information can facilitate shareholder 
monitoring of the board in making compensation-related decisions and lead to a better alignment 
of interests between shareholders and the board and managers, thus reducing agency costs. 
Holmstrom (1979) shows theoretically that any information about the agent’s actions can add 
value by making compensation contracts more efficient. In the setting of compensation disclosure, 
the information disclosed is about the board’s actions in designing compensation schemes and 
incentivizing managers, and shareholders make use of such information in monitoring the board. 
Although there are no explicit contracts between shareholders and the board, the disclosure of 
compensation-related information may provide shareholders with information on the board’s 
actions and aid shareholders in various activities that have corporate governance implications (e.g., 
class action lawsuits, shareholder proxy contests, say-on-pay votes, takeover bids, labor market 
decisions, or sale of shares).3 That is, greater transparency of the board’s action in designing CFO 
compensation contracts sheds light on the effectiveness of the board, which is otherwise not easily 
                                                          
1 We are not aware of any firm that, prior to 2006, voluntarily disclosed CFO compensation information when the 
CFO was not among the four highest compensated executive officers. 
2 Note that although the 2006 SEC rule also requires more detailed disclosure of compensation-related information 
for all NEOs, such requirements affect both the treatment firms and the control firms to the same extent and thus do 
not affect our inference based on the comparison between the treatment firms and the control firms. In other words, 
the assumption required in our setting is that the change in financial reporting quality is the same for treatment and 
control groups due to the expanded disclosure requirement of the 2006 rule (see same point made by Armstrong and 
Kepler 2018), but not so for the treatment effect (i.e., the first-time disclosure of CFO compensation) under the 2006 
SEC rule.  
3 See Armstrong et al. (2010) for a discussion of the role of informal contracts in mitigating agency conflicts between 
shareholders and the board.  
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observable by the shareholders (Gow et al., 2018). By increasing the reputation and litigation costs 
for the board, the enhanced transparency motivates the board to improve their effectiveness in 
CFO compensation design. Therefore, an application of Holmstrom’s theory to the agency 
problem between shareholders and the board suggests that the disclosure of CFO compensation 
information facilitates shareholder monitoring of the board and reduces agency costs, ultimately 
leading to a better alignment of interests between shareholders and the board and managers and 
better CFO job performance.4,5  
To measure CFO job performance, we focus on CFOs’ performance in financial reporting, 
because financial reporting is CFOs’ primary responsibility (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010; Kim et al., 
2011). In addition, the SEC’s decision to mandate compensation disclosure for CFOs is explicitly 
motivated by the CFO’s role in financial disclosure: “We believe that compensation of the 
principal financial officer is important to shareholders because, along with the principal executive 
officer, the principal financial officer provides the certifications required with the company’s 
periodic reports and has important responsibility for the fair presentation of the company’s 
financial statements and other financial information.”6 Consistent with the SEC’s argument, prior 
studies provide evidence that CFOs’ compensation is associated with internal control quality 
(Wang, 2010; Hoitash et al., 2012) and financial reporting quality (Indjejikian and Matějka, 2009; 
Jiang et al., 2010). 
                                                          
4 Murphy (2013) makes a similar prediction.  
5 For treatment firms, CFO’s compensation contracts were not disclosed before the 2006 rule, which makes it difficult 
to directly examine the change in CFO compensation contracts around the compensation disclosure. Thus, we examine 
the effect of compensation disclosure on CFO job performance, an outcome of CFO compensation contracts. In 
Section 4.4, we provide evidence on improved CFO compensation contracts on a subsample of firms that explicitly 
discuss compensation contracts for CFOs. 
6  Source: page 117, the SEC Securities Act release No. 33-8732A. https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-
8732a.pdf 
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Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2003-2012, we find that the treatment firms, 
compared to the control firms, exhibit a greater improvement in financial report quality, that is, a 
larger reduction in the frequency of accounting restatements and internal control weaknesses. The 
effects are both statistically significant and economically meaningful: After controlling for firm 
characteristics, the treatment firms’ probability of accounting restatements (internal control 
weaknesses) decreased around the 2006 rule by 4.4% (1.9%) more than the control firms. The 
results hold when we use a short window of two years around the 2006 rule, an alternative sample 
period of 2003-2010 and when we exclude the financial crisis period (2007-2008).  
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the SEC rule prior to 2006 required the 
disclosure of CFO compensation if and only if the CFO was among the four most highly 
compensated non-CEO executive officers. A potential concern is that firm and CFO 
characteristics of the treatment firms are systematically different from those of the control firms, 
and such differences may explain the difference in the change in CFO performance around the 
2006 rule for these two groups of firms. To address this concern, we conduct two further tests. 
First, we construct a propensity-score-matched (PSM hereafter) sample of control firms. Using 
the PSM sample (86 pairs of treatment and control firms), we continue to find that the treatment 
firms exhibit a more pronounced improvement in financial reporting quality around the 
implementation of the 2006 rule. Second, we identify an alternative group of control firms whose 
CFOs were the lowest paid among the top four non-CEO executives before the 2006 rule. 
Arguably, this group of CFOs is more similar to the CFOs in the treatment group in terms of their 
characteristics. Based on this alternative control group, we continue to find a greater improvement 
in financial reporting quality for the treatment group around the 2006 rule.    
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Our theoretical arguments suggest that compensation disclosure facilitates shareholder 
monitoring of the board’s compensation practice, which encourages the board to improve its 
compensation design and provide more appropriate incentives for CFOs (incentive effect). To 
provide evidence on the said mechanism, based on the PSM sample, we manually collect the 
performance measures applicable to CFOs after the 2006 rule for both the treatment and control 
firms. Among these firms explicitly discussing performance measures applicable to CFOs, the 
number of performance measures applied to CFOs is higher for treatment firms than for control 
firms under the 2006 rule. To the extent that more performance measures indicate more efficient 
compensation contracts (Holmstrom, 1979), this descriptive summary suggests that after the first-
time disclosure of CFO compensation for treatment firms, boards provide more efficient contracts 
for CFOs of treatment firms than of control firms under the 2006 rule, consistent with the 
mechanism we posit. In addition, we find that treatment firms are more likely to adopt clawback 
provisions in compensation contracts than the control firms after the 2006 rule. This evidence 
again is consistent with improved incentive and better compensation design for the treatment firms.  
Other than the above mechanism, the disclosure of CFOs’ compensation-related information 
can improve CFOs’ performance through another mechanism: Compensation disclosure may 
expose firms with low-quality CFOs and force them to replace low-quality CFOs with high-
quality candidates, which in turn leads to better performance (labor market effect). This is 
essentially a signaling effect, by disclosing compensation, lower-quality CFO who are paid less 
will be exposed to the market, and in anticipation of this adverse signaling, boards will replace 
these low-quality CFOs with high-quality CFOs to preempt criticism and scrutiny from the 
shareholders. Although both mechanisms are broadly consistent with compensation disclosure 
facilitating shareholder monitoring of the board and reducing agency costs, we are interested 
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primarily in the incentive effect. For this purpose, we identify treatment firms without CFO 
turnovers around the implementation of the 2006 rule by manually collecting the names of the 
CFOs who certify financial statements under Section 302 and 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in the two years before and two years after the 2006 rule. We find that the improvement in CFO 
performance in financial reporting still remains for treatment firms without CFO turnovers. Thus, 
our results of improved CFO performance is at least partly attributable to the incentive effect of 
CFO compensation disclosure.  
Next, we predict that the impact of compensation-information disclosure on CFO 
performance varies with CFOs’ implicit incentives, the internal monitoring of CFOs, and external 
litigation threats. First, younger CFOs have greater reputational concerns due to their longer 
horizons (e.g., Cheng, 2004). When faced with stronger shareholder monitoring under the 2006 
rule, young CFOs are more likely to increase effort to improve performance in financial reporting. 
Second, CFOs subject to weaker internal monitoring from the audit committee before the 2006 
rule are likely more sensitive to the increase in external shareholder monitoring under the 2006 
rule and thus exhibit a larger improvement in job performance. Third, if a firm does not properly 
compensate and incentivize its CFO, shareholders may use the newly disclosed CFO 
compensation information required under the 2006 rule to aid in the litigation process, exposing 
the firm to greater litigation costs. Thus, firms facing higher ex-ante litigation risk before the rule 
are more likely to respond to the CFO compensation-information disclosure mandate with a better 
alignment between the CFO’s compensation and his financial reporting duties, resulting in better 
performance. Results from cross-sectional analyses support these predictions: The improvement 
in CFOs’ performance in financial reporting around the 2006 rule is more pronounced for firms 
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with younger CFOs, with CFOs subject to weaker pre-rule internal monitoring, and with higher 
pre-rule litigation risk.   
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we add to the literature on the effect of 
disclosure. Although many studies show the effects of financial-information disclosure, evidence 
on the benefits of compensation-information disclosure is relatively scarce.7 The relative scarcity 
of evidence on the impact of regulations on compensation-information disclosure is partly 
attributable to the difficulty in locating control groups that allow for a clear identification of the 
regulatory effects, which is a challenge that studies on regulatory effects commonly face (Leuz, 
2007; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). By exploiting the differential impact of the CFO compensation 
disclosure mandate on firms already disclosing CFO compensation and firms starting to disclose 
CFO compensation, we draw a causal inference of the disclosure of CFO compensation 
information on CFO job performance. Using the firms that were already required to disclose CFO 
compensation information prior to 2006 as a benchmark group, our DiD analyses show that firms 
that are required under the 2006 rule to start disclosing CFO compensation information exhibit an 
improvement in CFO performance in financial reporting relative to the control firms. Further 
strengthening our conclusion, cross-sectional analyses indicate that the improvement in CFOs’ 
performance in financial reporting around the 2006 rule for the treatment firms varies with the 
characteristics of the firms and the CFOs in ways predicted by economic theories.   
Our paper is related to Jin and Leslie (2003), who show that the 1998 Los Angeles County 
requirement that hygiene-quality grade cards be displayed in restaurant windows causes an 
improvement in restaurant hygiene quality. Whereas the disclosure requirement studied by Jin and 
                                                          
7 Exceptions are Gipper (2017), Bloomfield (2018), Ferri et al. (2018), and Wang et al. (2018), all of which study the 
effects of the expanded compensation disclosure requirement under the 2006 SEC rule. Three of them examine the 
change in CEO compensation, whereas Ferri et al. (2018) examine the change in market reaction to earnings 
announcements (i.e., ERC). 
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Leslie (2003) is accompanied by an assessment of product quality (as in the hygiene grade cards 
issued by Department of Health Services), the disclosure requirement in our setting requires only 
the disclosure of compensation practice, without any associated quality assessment (i.e., what is 
good compensation practice vs. what is not). 8  Our findings suggest that disclosure of 
compensation information alone can facilitate shareholder monitoring and improve corporate 
performance in financial reporting, thus providing policy implications beyond Jin and Leslie.9  
Our study is also related to Ferri et al. (2018), who hypothesize and find that the 2006 SEC 
compensation-disclosure rule reduces investors’ uncertainty about managers’ incentives and 
reporting objectives, as evidenced by an increase in the earnings response coefficient (ERC). By 
contrast, we extend the theory of Holmstrom (1979) and hypothesize that the disclosure of CFO 
compensation information facilitates shareholder monitoring on board’s designing CFO 
compensation contracts and leads to better CFO job performance in providing high-quality 
financial reports. Although our empirical evidence is consistent with that of Ferri et al. in that 
rational investors will respond to higher reporting quality with a higher ERC, the two studies are 
conceptually different because investors’ uncertainty about managers’ reporting incentives (and 
their reaction to financial reports) can vary without any change in the underlying reporting quality. 
In fact, using discretionary accruals to measure reporting quality, Ferri et al. (Table 7) find no 
evidence of higher reporting quality following the 2006 rule. By contrast, we find robust evidence 
that the 2006 rule results in higher reporting quality, as reflected in less restatement, less internal 
control weakness, and lower discretionary accruals. The difference in findings between our study 
                                                          
8 The SEC emphasized that the purpose of the 2006 rule is to make more compensation information available to 
shareholders, and that the SEC is not trying to set executive compensation or pass judgement on boards’ compensation 
decisions (White, 2006). 
9 In a concurrent paper, Li and Xu (2016) show that the mandatory disclosure rule increases CFO pay level and 
turnover and conclude that the new rule results in greater agency costs for the firms affected. Our study complements 
Li and Xu (2016) by providing a more balanced view on the cost and benefit of this mandatory disclosure rule. 
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and Ferri et al. is potentially attributable to the different settings exploited by the two studies. 
Whereas both studies use a DiD research design to examine the effect of the 2006 rule, the 
identification strategies are different. Ferri et al.’s identification relies on different fiscal year-ends 
across firms, but our identification comes from the combined effect of (1) the 2006 rule mandating 
the disclosure of CFO compensation for all SEC registrants, and (2) a subset of these firms already 
disclosing CFO compensation information prior to 2006.10 Our research design and findings are 
consistent with industry practitioners’ view that the mandatory disclosure of CFO compensation 
is “a major benefit” of the 2006 rule (Harris, 2007). Ultimately, reporting quality is a different 
theoretical construct than investors’ uncertainty about manager reporting incentives; thus, our 
study and Ferri et al. complement each other by documenting two distinct but non-mutually 
exclusive effects of the 2006 rule, one on corporate financial reporting behavior and the other on 
investors’ perception of reporting objectives.  
Second, our study adds to the burgeoning research on CFOs. Prior studies document a 
positive association between compensation incentive and CFO performance (Wang, 2010; Kim et 
al., 2011; Hoitash et al., 2012). Our study shows that the mere disclosure of CFO compensation 
information can have a significant impact on CFO’s performance. Our evidence also suggests that 
the CFO plays a distinct and material role in determining financial reporting quality, thus adding 
to the literature on the relative importance of CEOs and CFOs in making financial reporting 
decisions (Jiang et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2011). 
Last, our analyses indicate that the 2006 SEC rule, by requiring the disclosure of CFO 
compensation information, results in an improvement in CFO performance in financial reporting 
                                                          
10 One feature of our treatment is that it represents a single homogenous treatment for the treatment group, whereas 
the treatment in Ferri et al. (2018) is better characterized as providing non-homogeneous treatments that depend on 
how particular firms endogenously choose to interpret and implement the rules (Armstrong and Kepler, 2018). 
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for firms that did not disclose CFO compensation information prior to 2006. This evidence has 
regulatory implications, especially given that the disclosure of compensation information has long 
been a favorite method used by the SEC and the Congress in response to public outcries about 
executive compensation in the U.S. (Murphy, 2013). In addition, the finding is informative to the 
SEC because the SEC explicitly states that CFOs’ important role in financial disclosure motivates 
its decision to mandate CFO compensation disclosure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background information 
and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 reports empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Securities Act release No. 33-8732A requires 
the expanded disclosure of information related to executive and director compensation starting 
from the end of 2006.11 The SEC is “strongly committed to helping investors get the information 
they need (through required disclosure for public companies) about executive compensation so 
that shareholders and investors can judge that, however they choose and react however they like” 
(White, 2006).  
The 2006 rules regarding compensation disclosure are different from the old rules in two 
aspects. First, more information (expanded) is required to be disclosed: the criteria used in 
reaching executive compensation decisions and the relation between the company’s executive 
                                                          
11 Compensation information is disclosed in annual proxy statements and annual reports on Form 10-K (for large 
public firms) or 10-KSB (for small businesses). Annual reports on Form 10-K or 10-KSB typically refer readers to the 
information in the annual proxy statement rather than presenting the information directly. Companies must comply 
with SEC Act release No. 33-8732A in Forms 10-K and 10-KSB for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2006 
or in any proxy statements filed on or after December 15, 2006, that are required to include such information for fiscal 
years ending on or after December 15, 2006. 
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compensation practices and corporate performance. Second, the new rules change the definition 
of NEOs whose compensations are required to be disclosed from including CEO and the next four 
most highly compensated executive officers to including the CEO, CFO, and the next three most 
highly compensated executive officers.  
The second change offers a nice setting for us to make a causal inference on how 
compensation disclosure affects job performance. Specifically, the firms that were already 
disclosing compensation-related information for CFOs before 2006 have to continue to do so, 
whereas the firms that were not disclosing compensation-related information for CFOs before 
2006 are now required to. As such, we are able to identify a treatment group and a control group, 
and comparing the two can difference out any effect due to other confounding factors that affect 
both. Furthermore, by focusing on CFOs, we can tease out an important effect of the 2006 rule, 
because CFOs are of particular importance in financial reporting decisions (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010; 
Kim et al., 2011). 
Extending agency theory (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979), we contend that the 
disclosure of CFOs’ compensation information facilitates shareholder monitoring of the board’s 
actions in designing CFOs’ compensation schemes, which in turn mitigates agency conflict 
between shareholders and the board, and ultimately results in better CFO incentives and 
performance. Holmstrom (1979) theory suggests that greater information that helps reveal 
managers’ actions can improve the contract efficiency between shareholders and managers. In our 
setting of compensation disclosure under the 2006 rule, the information disclosed is about the 
board’s actions in designing compensation schemes and incentivizing managers. The improved 
transparency of the board’s actions in designing CFO compensation contracts sheds light on the 
effectiveness of the board, which is otherwise not easily observable by the shareholders (Gow et 
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al., 2018). Applying the logic in Holmstrom’s theory, as long as the disclosure of compensation-
related information provides shareholders with information on the board’s actions, shareholders 
make use of such information in monitoring the board and conducting various activities that have 
corporate governance implications (e.g., class action lawsuits, shareholder proxy contests, say-on-
pay proposals and votes, takeover bids, labor market decisions, or sale of shares). By increasing 
the reputation and litigation costs for the board, enhanced disclosure and shareholder monitoring 
could motivate the board to provide better compensation incentives for CFOs. Therefore, 
enhanced shareholder monitoring of the board’s compensation practice is expected to encourage 
the board to improve its compensation design and provide more appropriate incentives for CFOs, 
resulting in better CFO performance.12 
 Based on the above arguments, we expect that the improvement in CFOs’ job performance 
around the 2006 rule is greater for firms starting to disclose CFO compensation information 
(treatment group) compared to firms continuing to disclose CFO compensation information 
(control group). We thus hypothesize the following in the alternative form: 
H1: Relative to the control group, firms in the treatment group exhibit a greater improvement in 
CFOs’ job performance under the 2006 rule. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
We obtain the initial S&P 1500 firm list from ExecuComp and accounting information from 
Compustat, from CRSP the stock price and return data to compute variables based on stock returns, 
                                                          
12 Gipper (2017) also proposes the improved transparency of pay details subject the board to greater shareholder 
monitoring, consistent with our arguments here. They study the effect of greater shareholder monitoring reflected in 
pay level for all NEOs, whereas we focus on better incentivized compensation contracts for CFOs (not necessarily 
higher pay) and better CFO performance. In an additional test, we control for the effect of pay increase on CFO 
performance.  
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from ISS the individual director data, and from Thomas Reuters the institutional holding data. Data 
on accounting restatements and internal control weaknesses are from Audit Analytics.  
We first extract the list of S&P 1500 firms (past and present) for the year 2006 from 
Compustat and ExecuComp, which consists of 1,672 firms. For each firm, we search the 10-K 
filings and collect the names of the CFOs who certify the financial statements under Section 302 
and 906 of SOX for the two most recent years ending before December 15, 2006 (the effective 
date of the 2006 rule). Having identified the certifying CFOs, we then look through the proxy 
statements (DEF14A forms) for the two consecutive years ending before December 15, 2006 to 
determine whether the CFOs’ compensation was (not) disclosed in the pre-rule period. In this way, 
we do not need to rely on the job title in ExecuComp to determine the designated CFO of the firm 
and whether her/his pay was disclosed, which reduces coding errors.13 Identifying CFOs manually 
also allows us to compile the list of firms with or without CFO turnover, as needed in later analysis. 
Among our initial sample of 1,672 firms, we exclude 247 firms that disclosed CFOs’ compensation 
in one year but not in the other year before the 2006 rule, because we cannot consistently classify 
them as treatment or control firms. Of the remaining 1,425 firms, 146 (1,279) never (consistently) 
disclosed CFOs’ compensation in the two consecutive years before the 2006 rule, and we thus 
classify them as treatment (control) firms. After excluding firms with missing financial data, our 
final sample to test H1 for the analysis of financial reporting and internal control quality includes 
9,246 and 9,239 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2012, respectively, covering 1,183 unique 
firms, among which 109 (1,074) are treatment (control) firms. 
3.1. Measures of CFOs’ job performance 
                                                          
13 ExecuComp provides compensation data, executive names, and their titles, as disclosed in proxy statements. In 
ExecuComp, CFOs’ job titles are expressed by multiple terms, such as Chief Financial Officer, Chief Accounting 
Officers, and Vice President-Finance, which makes it difficult to determine who is the principal financial officer 
designated by the firm.  
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CFOs’ primary role includes financial reporting and maintaining effective internal controls, 
and SOX Section 302 and 906 require CFOs to certify the financial statements and internal control. 
We thus follow prior literature and measure CFOs’ performance by financial reporting and internal 
control quality (Bedard et al., 2014). Our first measure of CFOs’ job performance is accounting 
restatement (excluding restatements that are due to a change in accounting standards or merger 
and acquisitions), which is an ex-post measure of poor financial reporting quality. Prior literature 
often uses accounting restatement to examine the association between financial reporting quality 
and managerial characteristics (e.g., Aier et al., 2005; Demerjian et al., 2013). We obtain non-
reliance accounting restatements from Audit Analytics. RESTAT is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a firm’s financial statements are subsequently restated, and zero otherwise. 
Our second measure of CFOs’ job performance is the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting. Section 404 of SOX requires that firms attach an auditor-attested report that 
highlights material weaknesses in internal control to their 10-K filings. Auditing Standard No. 2 
requires auditors to provide an opinion on a client’s internal control over financial reporting. We 
obtain the Section 404 reports from the Audit Analytics and use two measures of internal control 
quality. Specifically, ICW_D is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s auditor reports at least 
one material weaknesses in its internal control, and zero otherwise. Ln(ICW_COUNT) is log of 
one plus the count of material weaknesses in the auditors’ internal control report required under 
Section 404.   
3.2. Empirical models 
Tests of accounting restatements 
We augment the model in Cao et al. (2012) to test the effect of the 2006 rule on accounting 
restatement (H1): 
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𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +  𝛼3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑇) + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉 +
𝛼6𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐺 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼8𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼10𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛼11𝑀𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑅 +
𝛼12𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝛼13𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛼14𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼15𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇 +
𝛼16𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + Ɛ                                   (1)  
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable RESTAT, an inverse measure of CFOs’ job 
performance. TREAT equals one if a firm is a treatment firm, which did not disclose CFOs’ 
compensation-related information in the proxy statements before the 2006 rule, and zero otherwise. 
POST equals one for firm-years with the fiscal yearends on or after December 15, 2006, and zero 
otherwise. Our variable of interest, TREAT×POST, captures the differential change in CFOs’ job 
performance for treatment firms relative to control firms in the post-2006 period. H1 predicts the 
coefficient on TREAT×POST (α3) to be negative, consistent with a greater improvement in CFOs’ 
job performance for treatment firms than for control firms under the 2006 rule. 
 We control for various firm characteristics in prior studies (Cao et al., 2012; DeFond et al., 
2016): firm size (Ln(AT)), leverage (LEV), operational complexity (FOREIGN and BUSSEG), and 
firm performance (ROA and LOSS). Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms with greater financing 
needs are more likely to conduct financial fraud, which results in the restatement of their financial 
statements. We thus control for merger and acquisitions (MERGER) and new financing 
(FINANCING). MERGER is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is engaged in a merger or 
acquisition during the year, and zero otherwise. FINANCING is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the number of shares outstanding increases by at least 10 percent during the year, or if long-term 
debt increases by at least 20 percent during the year, and zero otherwise. Prior studies find that 
weak corporate governance negatively affects a firm’s financial reporting quality, so we control 
for a number of corporate governance variables, including the proportion of independent directors 
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on board (INDEPENDENT), the number of directors on board (BOARDSIZE), and insider 
ownership (INSIDER). Finally, we include industry fixed effects in the model because the 
likelihood of accounting restatement may vary across industries. In all of our estimation analyses 
of CFOs’ job performance, standard errors are clustered by firms. 
Tests of internal control quality 
We next estimate the following model in Ogneva et al. (2007) to test the effect of the 2006 
rule on firms’ internal control quality: 
𝐼𝐶𝑊 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +  𝛼3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +  𝛼4𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐺 +
𝛼5𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛼8𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐺 + 𝛼9𝐼𝑁𝑉 + 𝛼10𝑀𝐾𝑉 +
𝛼11𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼12𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛼13𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸) + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + Ɛ              (2)  
where the dependent variable is alternately an indicator for internal control with material 
weaknesses (ICW_D) or the log of one plus the count of material weaknesses in a firm’s internal 
control (Ln(ICW_COUNT)). When ICW is proxied by ICW_D, the logit model is used; when 
proxied by Ln(ICW_COUNT), OLS estimation is used. A negative coefficient estimate on 
TREAT×POST is consistent with H1 that CFOs’ job performance improves to a larger extent for 
treatment firms than for control firms. 
Control variables are based on prior studies (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007; Bedard et al., 2014). Ge 
and McVay (2005) and Doyle et al. (2007) find that internal-control weakness is more likely for 
more complex firms. We, therefore, include BUSSEG and FOREIGN to control for a firm’s 
operational complexity. RESTRUCTURE is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has non-
zero restructuring costs, and zero otherwise. We include MERGER and RESTRUCTURE because 
a firm’s structural changes are related to its internal control quality (Doyle et al., 2007). Ogneva 
et al. (2007) document a negative association between a firm’s accounting application 
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measurement risk and its internal control quality. We, therefore, include sales growth (SALE_G) 
and inventory level (INV) in the model. We include market value of equity (MKV), loss indicator 
(LOSS), and a firm’s bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE) to control for a firm’s size and financial health 
(Doyle et al., 2007). Finally, we control for a firm’s age (Ln(AGE)), because Doyle et al. (2007) 
show that the likelihood of having material weaknesses is higher for younger firms.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate analyses 
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for measures of CFOs’ job performance 
and control variables. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, we winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distribution in the sample. We find that 10.3 percent 
of the firm-years’ financial statements are subsequently restated and 5.5 percent of the firm-years 
in our sample disclose at least one material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. 
For firms with material weaknesses in internal control, the number of weaknesses ranges from one 
to 11. Descriptive statistics of control variables are comparable to those reported in prior studies 
(e.g., Doyle et al., 2007; Cao et al., 2012). 
Table 1, Panels B and C provide the correlation matrix for the samples of accounting 
restatement and internal control quality, respectively. We find a significant negative correlation 
between accounting restatement (RESTAT) and the post-rule indicator (POST). We also find a 
negative relation between POST with the two measures of internal control quality (ICW_D and 
Ln(ICW_COUNT)). These results suggest that firms in general exhibit better financial reporting 
quality in the post-2006 period, which makes it important to identify a control group to difference 
out the impact of contemporaneous events.  
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Table 1, Panel D reports the univariate test result of the difference in accounting restatements 
and internal control weaknesses in the pre- and post-2006 periods for treatment firms and control 
firms, respectively. Both groups exhibit a reduction in restatement probability following the 2006 
rule. The reduction in the likelihood of accounting restatement is 0.050 (0.071-0.021) larger for 
treatment firms than for control firms, significant at the five percent level. For internal control 
quality, both treatment and control firms are less likely to disclose material weaknesses in internal 
control after the mandatory disclosure of CFO compensation information. The decreases in ICW_D 
and Ln(ICW_COUNT) for treatment firms are 0.065 and 0.096 greater than those for control firms, 
respectively, and are statistically significant. Overall, the univariate analysis provides evidence 
supporting H1 that treatment firms exhibit a greater improvement in CFOs’ job performance than 
control firms under the 2006 rule. 
4.2. Multivariate analyses 
Table 2 presents the logit regression result of estimating Eq. (1). The coefficient estimate on 
the interaction TREAT×POST is -0.657, significant at the five percent level (z-statistics = -2.38), 
and the marginal effect on RESTAT is -0.044, which is slightly less than the economic magnitude 
obtained in the univariate analysis. The significantly negative coefficient on TREAT×POST 
supports H1 that the disclosure of CFO compensation information improves CFOs’ job 
performance in financial reporting to a greater extent for treatment firms relative to control firms.14 
The coefficient on POST, which captures the time-series change in the likelihood of accounting 
restatement for control firms in the post-2006 period, is also significantly negative, consistent with 
the univariate results in Panel D of Table 1. The coefficient on TREAT, which captures the 
difference between treatment and control firms in the pre-2006 period, is significant, suggesting 
                                                          
14 We obtain significant and negative coefficient on TREAT×POST when we estimate Eq. (1) using OLS regression. 
The same is true when we estimate Eq. (2) using OLS regression.  
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there is a pre-treatment difference between the treatment and control groups. However, this is not 
detrimental to our DiD design because DiD design allows a pre-treatment difference as long as it 
does not change without the treatment effect (parallel trend assumption). We also more formally 
test the parallel trend assumption employing a dynamic model in a later section.  
Table 3 presents the regression results of estimating Eq. (2) using both measures of internal 
control quality. In Column (1), in which the dependent variable is an indicator for internal control 
weaknesses (ICW_D), the coefficient estimate on TREAT×POST is -1.127 (z-statistic = -3.02). The 
marginal effect on ICW_D is estimated to be -0.019, which is smaller than the economic magnitude 
shown in the univariate test. The significantly negative coefficient on TREAT×POST indicates that 
relative to control firms, treatment firms exhibit a greater improvement in internal control quality 
following CFO compensation disclosure in 2006, supporting H1. The coefficient on the main effect 
POST is also significantly negative, indicating that CFOs for control firms improve their 
performance in internal control quality under the 2006 rule, though the improvement is larger for 
treatment firms. Again, the existence of a difference between treatment and control firms before 
the 2006 rule, indicated by the significant coefficient on TREAT, does not violate the parallel trend 
assumption. Column (2) presents the regression results with the number of material weaknesses 
(Ln(ICW_COUNT)) as the dependent variable. The coefficient on TREAT×POST remains 
significantly negative, consistent with that reported in Column (1), suggesting that our results are 
robust to alternative measures of internal control quality.  
Overall, the results in Table 2 and Table 3 provide evidence and support H1 that relative to 
control firms, treatment firms exhibit an improvement in CFOs’ job performance after the 
disclosure of CFOs’ compensation under the 2006 rule.  
4.3. Alternative control firms 
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Propensity score matching 
Because whether a firm’s CFO was among the four highest-paid non-CEO executives whose 
compensation information was required to be disclosed before 2006 is not a random outcome, 
treatment firms and control firms could differ in terms of underlying characteristics. To address 
the endogeneity concern that certain firm characteristics related to CFOs’ compensation disclosure 
may also affect firms’ financial reporting quality, we adopt an alternative approach, namely, the 
propensity-score-matching (PSM) approach, to test H1. Specifically, we first estimate a logit 
model in Eq. (3) to determine the propensity score of being a treatment firm, using the latest firm 
characteristics prior to December 15, 2006. The firm characteristics are those that affect CFO 
compensation disclosure before 2006 as well as CFOs’ job performance in the second stage 
(Shipman et al., 2017), including firm size (Ln(SALE)), market-to-book (MTB), leverage (LEV), 
firm performance (ROA), annual stock return and its volatility (RETURN and RETVOL), and 
institutional holdings (INST). We also control for a number of corporate governance variables, 
including CEO duality (DUAL_D), the percentage of independent directors on the board 
(INDEPENDENT), and the number of directors on the board (BOARDSIZE).  
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸) + 𝛼2𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛼6𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 +
𝛼7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼9𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛼10𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿_𝐷 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + Ɛ                                                 (3) 
Based on the propensity score obtained from the above model, we identify for each treatment 
firm in our sample a matched control firm with the closest propensity score. We then re-estimate 
the baseline models using the matched treatment and control firms. 
The results are presented in Table 4. Panel A reports the logit regression results of Eq. (3). 
We find that larger firms (Ln(SALE)) and firms with fewer independent directors on board 
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(INDEPENDENT) are more likely to belong to the treatment group. Based on the fitted probability 
obtained from the logit model, we match each treatment firm to its closest control firm with a 
caliper of 0.1 and without replacement. This matching procedure yields 86 pairs of treatment and 
control firms. The univariate analysis (untabulated) shows that financial reporting quality is 
comparable for matched treatment and control firms in the pre-2006 period, but it is higher for 
treatment firms than for control firms in the post-2006 period. Panels B and C present the 
regression results of Eq. (1) and (2) for the PSM sample, respectively. Although the coefficient on 
TREAT turns to be statistically insignificant, we continue to find a significantly negative 
coefficient on TREAT×POST for both regressions, consistent with those reported in Tables 2 and 
3 and supporting H1. The results suggest that the improvement in CFOs’ job performance for 
treatment firms relative to control firms is not driven by the difference in firm characteristics 
between the two groups. The treatment and control groups no longer have a significant difference 
in CFOs’ performance in the pre-2006 rule period, suggesting that the PSM procedure further 
eliminates pre-treatment differences. The lack of pre-treatment difference in the PSM sample 
compared to the larger, primary sample we employ also indicates that PSM procedure may 
sacrifice generalizability (Shipman et al. 2017).  
An alternative group of control firms based on pre-rule CFO pay level 
We also identify an alternative group of control firms based on the conjecture that the 
compensation level reflects CFO characteristics. Control firms’ CFOs with compensation 
disclosed before the 2006 rule were among the four highest-paid non-CEO executives, whereas 
treatment firms’ CFOs without compensation disclosed before the rule were not. One may argue 
these two groups of CFOs may have very different characteristics that likely drive the differential 
change in financial reporting quality between treatment and control firms.  
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To address these concerns, we use the compensation level (relative to the other three highest-
paid executives) to proxy for the similarity in CFO characteristics. Specifically, we choose among 
the control firms a subgroup whose CFOs were the lowest paid among the top four non-CEO 
executives before 2006. Arguably, these CFOs are closer to treatment firms’ CFOs who are not 
among the top four non-CEO executives. Based on this alternative group of control firms, as Table 
5 shows, we continue to find a greater improvement in CFOs’ performance, that is, a greater 
reduction in the likelihood of accounting restatements and having material weaknesses in internal 
control, for treatment firms than control firms after the 2006 rule. 
4.4. Mechanisms causing CFO performance improvement 
Further evidence on the incentive effect - better-incentivized compensation contracts for CFOs 
 As we argued earlier, one mechanism that CFO compensation disclosure improves CFO 
performance is by motivating the board to design better compensation contracts for CFOs. To 
provide evidence on the said mechanism, we conduct the following analyses. First, assuming more 
performance measures adopted for CFO compensation indicates greater contract efficiency 
(Holmstrom, 1979), we test whether treatment firms adopt more performance measures in CFOs’ 
compensation contracts under the 2006 rule. Because the compensation contracts for CFOs of 
treatment firms were not disclosed before the 2006 rule, we focus on only CFOs’ compensation 
contracts under the 2006 rule. We manually collect the performance measures applicable to CFOs 
from the proxy statements for two years after the 2006 rule. We start with the 86 pairs of treatment 
and control firms for our PSM sample. Table 6 shows a simple descriptive summary of the number 
of performance measures (including financial measures) applicable to CFOs after the 2006 rule 
for treatment and control firms separately. We find that the number of performance measures, as 
well as the number of financial measures, are greater for the treatment firms than for the control 
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firms under the 2006 rule, and such differences are statistically significant at 10% level.15 Second, 
clawback provisions have been shown to improve financial reporting incentives and curb managers 
rent extraction (Chan et al. 2015), so clawback adoption can indicate boards doing a better job in 
designing the compensation contracts. Therefore, we further test whether clawback adoption is 
more prominent among the treatment firms than among the control firms. We rely on Corporate 
Library Database which provides clawback adoption information starting from 2007. Since we do 
not have the clawback adoption information prior to 2007, we only test whether more treatment 
firms adopt clawback provisions than control firms in the post-2006-rule period. We find that 
47.99% of treatment firms adopt clawbacks in the period from 2007 to 2012, greater than that of 
the control firms (35.05%), and the difference is significant at 1% level. The result suggests that 
the boards adopt better compensation practice for the treatment firms than for the control firms.   
CFO turnover – labor market effect vs. incentive effect 
The results above provide evidence on the incentive effect, that is, after the mandatory 
disclosure of CFO compensation, the board may provide more appropriate incentives for CFOs, 
which results in improved CFO performance. Another possible channel through which CFO 
performance improves is that CFO compensation disclosure exposes poor-quality CFOs with 
lower pay in the labor market. Specifically, after the mandatory disclosure of CFO compensation, 
investors and boards learn about the pay level and performance measures in compensation 
contracts for CFOs of their firms as well as of peer firms; investors might use this information to 
infer about managers’ ability and identify low-quality CFOs with lower pays. In anticipation of 
such adverse signaling from the compensation disclosure, boards are likely to replace poor-quality 
CFOs with more competent ones to preempt criticism and scrutiny from the shareholders, which 
                                                          
15 The mean number of performance measures (financial measures) applicable to CFOs of control firms in the pre-
2006 period is 3.00 (2.40), which is not statistically different from that for control firms in the post-2006 period. 
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in turn leads to better CFO performance (labor market effect). Consistent with the latter argument 
and the findings in Li and Xu (2016), we find that CFO turnover increases in the year immediately 
after the new compensation-disclosure rule, and more so for the treatment firms (19.86%) than for 
the control firms (14.70%). We calculate the ratio of CFOs’ total compensation to the average of 
the other three non-CEO NEOs’ for treatment firms with and without CFO turnovers in the pre- 
and post-2006 periods separately. Before the 2006 rule, CFOs’ relative pay is comparable between 
the two groups of treatment firms, whereas under the 2006 rule, the relative pay of the incoming 
CFOs for treatment firms with CFO turnovers is higher than that for treatment firms without CFO 
turnovers. This result is consistent with the labor market effect that treatment firms likely replace 
poor-quality CFOs with more competent ones around the mandatory disclosure of CFO 
compensation.  
Although both effects are broadly consistent with enhanced monitoring on the board by 
shareholders, we are primarily interested in the incentive effect. To assess whether the labor market 
effect drives our result, we re-run our main analyses by separating treatment firms with CFO 
turnovers from those without CFO turnovers. Specifically, using the hand-collected CFO names 
in the two years before and two years after the 2006 rule, we identify treatment firms with/without 
CFO turnovers within the four-year period. 16  We then re-estimate Eq. (1) and (2) for the 
subsample of treatment firms without CFO turnovers together with the control firms. Table 7 
reports the regression results. In Panel A, for treatment firms without CFO turnover, the coefficient 
on TREAT×POST is significantly negative, indicating an improvement in CFO performance for 
treatment firms relative to control firms. Similarly, in Panel B, our result of the decreased 
likelihood of material weaknesses in internal control continues to hold for treatment firms without 
                                                          
16 Results are similar if we identify treatment firms with and without CFO turnovers in the first year following the 
2006 rule. 
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CFO turnovers. Thus, our results of improved CFO performance for treatment firms are not driven 
merely by the labor market effect, but at least partly attributable to the incentive effect.17   
4.5. Cross-sectional analyses 
CFOs’ career and reputation concerns 
The results above are consistent with our arguments that the disclosure of CFOs’ 
compensation information for treatment firms, as required by the 2006 rule, facilitates external 
monitoring and contract efficiency in CFOs’ compensation schemes, which provide incentives to 
CFOs to perform better. Prior literature suggests that executives in their early years of service have 
stronger incentives to build up their reputation for ability (Holmstrom, 1982; Cheng, 2004), and 
thus have greater incentives to improve performance when faced with enhanced external 
monitoring. We thus expect that the improvement in CFOs’ performance caused by the 2006 rule 
is likely to be stronger for treatment firms with younger CFOs.18 Because CFO turnover induced 
by the 2006 rule may affect firms’ financial reporting and internal control, we consider only firms 
with the same CFO in the pre- and post-2006 periods (723 of 1,183 firms in our sample). We hand-
collect CFOs’ age from proxy statements and partition the 723 firms into two groups based on the 
age of CFOs. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 report the regression results for the subsamples, with 
the results for accounting restatement in Panel A and those for internal control quality in Panel 
B.19 For both panels, the coefficient estimates on TREAT×POST are significantly negative only 
for firms with below-median-aged CFOs and insignificant for firms with above-median-aged 
CFOs. The finding that the improvement in CFOs’ job performance for treatment firms around 
                                                          
17  Untabulatd results show that for treatment firms with CFO turnovers, there is also an improvement in CFO 
performance, consistent with the labor market effect of replacing poor-quality with high-quality CFOs due to the 
adverse signaling effect arising from disclosure. 
18 Because the years of service as CFOs typically are not disclosed in their biographical information, we use CFOs’ 
age as a proxy for the career and reputation concerns. 
19 For the purpose of brevity, for the analysis of internal control quality, we tabulate only the regression results based 
on Ln(ICW_COUNT). Results for the other internal control quality measure (ICW_D) are qualitatively similar. 
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2006 rule is concentrated in the group of younger CFOs with higher reputation concerns is 
consistent with our argument that the disclosure of CFOs’ compensation increases shareholder 
monitoring, which provides greater incentives for CFOs to improve performance.  
Internal monitoring over CFO by audit committees  
Audit committees play an important role in monitoring a firm’s financial reporting quality as 
well as CFOs’ performance (Klein, 2002; Farber, 2005; Badolato et al., 2014). When the internal 
monitoring from the audit committee was weak before the rule, the effect of external monitoring 
from shareholders will be more salient. If the CFO compensation disclosure under the 2006 rule 
enhances external shareholders’ monitoring of the board in designing the compensation contract 
and thus improves CFO performance in financial reporting for the treatment group, we expect the 
improvement to be more pronounced for treatment firms with weak audit committees before the 
2006 rule. We follow Kroos et al. (2018) and measure the power of the audit committee relative 
to that of the CFO to proxy for the audit-committee monitoring over the CFO (labeled as POWER). 
For each firm-year, we calculate it as the log of one plus the number of financial experts on the 
audit committee times the log of one plus the number of outside board seats of audit committee 
members deflated by the sum of one plus an indicator variable that equals one if the CFO is on the 
board, and zero otherwise. We then partition our sample into firms with weak (below-median) and 
strong (above-median) pre-2006 audit committee monitoring (POWER) and test the differential 
effect of CFO compensation disclosure on the two subsamples. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 
report the regression results for the two subsamples. For both panels, the coefficients on 
TREAT×POST are significantly negative only for firms with weak audit committees and are 
statistically insignificant for firms with strong audit committees. The results provide evidence that 
in the post-2006 period, CFOs of treatment firms improve their performance relative to those of 
27 
 
control firms only when the audit committees are relatively weak and external shareholder 
monitoring plays a more important role. Because CFOs’ impact on financial reporting is more 
salient for firms with weak audit committees (Beck and Mauldin, 2014), the cross-sectional 
analysis based on the monitoring of the audit committee also helps strengthen the argument that 
the improvement is the financial reporting is due to CFOs’ better performance. 
Ex-ante litigation risk 
Prior literature finds that firms with accounting restatements are likely subject to litigation 
lawsuits, in which executives including CFOs are named as defendants (e.g., Palmrose and Scholz, 
2004). In the post-2006 period, with more information on CFOs’ compensation for treatment firms, 
investors can better monitor the boards’ actions in designing CFO compensation schemes and 
incentivizing CFOs and take actions, including lodging litigation lawsuits against firms and CFOs. 
We thus expect that treatment firms with high litigation risk before the 2006 rule are more likely 
to better align CFOs’ incentives with shareholders’ under the 2006 rule, which may lead to greater 
improvement in financial reporting. We follow Kim and Skinner (2012) and calculate the ex-ante 
probability of litigation (LITIGATION) for each firm-year using the coefficient estimate from 
Table 7, column (3) in their paper. We then partition the firms on the basis of their average pre-
rule LITIGATION into subsamples with high (above-median) and low (below-median) litigation 
risk and test the differential effect of CFO pay disclosure on the two subsamples. Columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 8 report the regression results. For the analyses of accounting restatement and internal 
control quality, the coefficients on TREAT×POST are significantly negative only for firms with 
high litigation risk and are insignificant for firms with low litigation risk. The results suggest that 
treatment firms exhibit an improvement in CFO performance under the 2006 rule only when they 
face high ex-ante litigation risk in the pre-rule period. 
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4.6. Robustness tests 
Dynamic analysis 
The validity of the DiD test relies on the parallel trend assumption: Absent the mandatory 
disclosure of CFO compensation under the 2006 rule, treatment firms would exhibit a time-series 
pattern in CFOs’ job performance similar to that of the control firms. To examine the trend in 
CFOs’ job performance between the two groups, we replace POST with five new indicators, POST-
1, POST0, POST1, POST2, and POST3+, and then interact them with TREAT. POST-1 equals one for 
fiscal years that end between December 15, 2005, and December 15, 2006, and zero otherwise. 
POST0 (POST1, POST2) equals one for fiscal years that end between December 15, 2006 (2007, 
2008), and December 15, 2007 (2008, 2009), and zero otherwise. POST3+ equals one for fiscal 
years that end after December 15, 2009, and zero otherwise. Table 9 reports the regression results 
for accounting restatements and internal control quality. In both regressions, the coefficient 
estimates on TREAT×POST-1 are statistically insignificant, suggesting the pre-treatment difference 
in CFOs’ job performance between the treatment and control firms, captured by TREAT, remains 
constant prior to the mandatory disclosure of CFO compensation, consistent with the parallel trend 
assumption. More importantly, for the test of internal control quality (accounting restatement), the 
coefficients on the remaining interaction terms (except TREAT×POST1) are all significantly 
negative. The results suggest that the improvement in CFOs’ job performance in treatment firms 
relative to control firms occurs only under the 2006 rule, providing evidence on a causal effect of 
CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ job performance. The above result also holds when we control for 
year fixed effects. 
An alternative measure of CFOs’ job performance 
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Jiang et al. (2010) find that CFOs’ compensation is associated with accruals-based earnings 
management. We thus use accrual quality alternately to proxy for CFOs’ job performance, and 
examine its relation to the disclosure of CFOs’ compensation information for treatment firms. 
Specifically, we estimate the following accrual model developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
and modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) for each industry-year with at least 
20 observations: 
𝑊𝐶_𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸_𝐺𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 + Ɛ𝑡             (4) 
where WC_C is change in working capital accruals deflated by total assets. CF is cash flow from 
operations deflated by total assets. SALE_C and PPE are the change in sales and the current level 
of property, plant, and equipment, respectively. Absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|) is the 
absolute value of the estimated residual from Eq. (4). 
Table 10 presents the regression results for the analyses of CFOs’ job performance based on 
absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|). The coefficient estimate on the interaction TREAT×POST 
is -0.004 and is statistically significant with a t-statistic of -2.03, consistent with H1 that after the 
mandatory disclosure of CFO compensation, treatment firms exhibit an improvement in financial 
reporting relative to control firms. In addition, the coefficient estimate on the main effect, POST, 
is significantly negative, indicating that control groups exhibit less absolute discretionary accruals, 
that is, an improvement in financial reporting, in the post-2006 period.20 
Change in CFOs’ pay 
                                                          
20 The reason we find a significant improvement in reporting quality whereas Ferri et al. (2018) do not is possibly 
because our identification of treatment firms is different from theirs (see our discussion in the introduction). Our 
results are not necessarily contrasting Ferri et al.’s, however, because Ferri et al. focus on the reduction in investors’ 
uncertainty about managers’ reporting incentive due to the 2006 rule, whereas we focus on the enhanced monitoring 
of the board effectiveness regarding CFO compensation design.  
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Li and Xu (2016) document a post-2006-rule increase in CFOs’ total compensation. Gipper 
(2017) also documents an increase in all NEOs’ compensation post the 2006 expanded disclosure 
requirement. To mitigate the concern that the increased pay itself without necessarily increasing 
the compensation contracting efficiency causes improved CFOs’ job performance under the 2006 
rule, we control for CFOs’ pay level or change in CFO’s pay around the 2006 rule in the main 
regression. For the treatment group prior to the 2006 rule, we use the lowest pay among the non-
CEO executives as the pseudo pay of the CFO whose pay is not disclosed. The addition of this 
variable does not change our main inference. Therefore, the increase in CFO pay itself cannot 
explain our main results.  
Other robustness tests 
In the main analyses, we use a long window to increase the test power. However, one may be 
concerned that long window increases the chance of confounding factors at play. We, therefore, 
limit our sample to only one year before and one year after the 2006 rule. Our main results in Table 
2 and 3 remain robust for the two-year sample. The main results also hold for a period-balanced 
sample from 2003 to 2010, which corresponds to four years before and four years after the 2006 
rule. In another untabulated robustness test, we obtain results similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 
when we remove the middle years (2007 and 2008, which correspond to the 2008 financial crisis) 
from our sample.  
To further mitigate the concern that time-series change unrelated to the 2006 rule drives our 
results, we include year fixed effects and drop the stand-alone POST from the model. Results 
(untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. The results are also robust to 
a model in which firm fixed effects replace industry fixed effects and the stand-alone TREAT, 
suggesting that our results are not driven by time-invariant, firm-specific omitted variables. The 
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firm-fixed-effect model supplements the PSM sample and further alleviates the concern that firm-
specific characteristics, especially the difference between the treatment and control firms, explains 
our results. The baseline results also hold when we drop stand-alone TREAT and POST, and 
include both firm and year fixed effects. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the effect of the CFO compensation disclosure mandate by the SEC 
in December 2006 on CFOs’ job performance. Using hand-collected CFO data for S&P 1500 firms, 
we find that firms that did not disclose CFO compensation before the rule (treatment firms) 
experience a larger decrease in the likelihood of accounting restatement and internal control 
weaknesses under the 2006 rule relative to the firms that already disclosed CFO compensation 
before the rule (control firms), indicating that CFO compensation disclosure improves CFOs’ job 
performance. The results continue to hold for the subsample of treatment firms without CFO 
turnovers, indicating that improved CFO performance is not driven by firms replacing low-quality 
CFOs with more competent ones around the pay disclosure. These findings support the notion that 
the additional information required by the SEC 2006 rule, that is, CFOs’ pay level and its 
determinants, facilitates shareholder monitoring of the board in providing better incentives to 
CFOs, resulting in better CFO performance. Cross-sectionally, we find that the improvement in 
CFOs’ performance is more salient for firms with younger CFOs, with CFOs subject to weaker 
internal monitoring by audit committees before the 2006 rule, and firms with higher ex-ante pre-
rule litigation risk.  
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Our study substantiates the intended benefits of compensation disclosure regarding CFOs by 
the SEC. It also contributes to the disclosure literature, specifically the benefits of mandating the 
disclosure of compensation information.  
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Appendix Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Main variables of interest 
RESTAT 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm's financial statements are restated, and zero 
otherwise. 
ICW_D 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm discloses at least one material weakness in its 
internal control reported under SOX Section 404, and zero otherwise.  
Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
Natural log of one plus the count of material weaknesses in a firm’s internal control 
reported under SOX Section 404. 
TREAT 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm did not disclose its CFO’s compensation in the 
proxy statements for the latest two years before the 2006 rule (treatment firm), and zero 
otherwise 
POST 
An indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with fiscal year ending on or after 
December 15, 2006, and zero otherwise.  
Other variables  
BOARDSIZE The number of directors on board. 
BUSSEG Natural log of the number of a firm's business segments. 
CF Operating cash flow deflated by total assets. 
CFVOL Standard deviation of CF in the past five years. 
CURRENT The ratio of current assets to total assets. 
DA 
Signed discretionary accruals, which is the residual from the following equation developed 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002): WC_C = α + α1 CFt-1 + 
+ α2 CFt+ α3 CFt+1 + α4 SALE_G + α5 PPE + Ɛ, where WC_C is change in working capital 
accruals deflated by total assets, CF is cash flow from operations deflated by total assets, 
SALE_G is the changes in sales, and PPE is the current level of property, plant, and 
equipment divided by total assets.  
|DA| Absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA). 
DUAL_D 
An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
FINANCING 
An indicator variable equal to one if the number of shares outstanding increases by at least 
10 percent during the year, or if long-term debt increases by at least 20 percent during the 
year, and zero otherwise. 
FOREIGN The sum of the sales from foreign segments deflated by the sum of sales of all segments. 
INDEPENDENT 
The number of independent directors on board divided by the number of directors on 
board. 
INSIDER 
The number of shares owned by individuals holding 5% or more divided by number of 
shares outstanding. 
INST 
Number of shares owned by total institutional investors divided by number of shares 
outstanding.  
INV Inventory divided by total assets. 
LEV Long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by total assets. 
LITIGATION 
The probability of being sued in year y+1, estimated based on the model in Table 7, 
Column 3 of Kim and Skinner (2012). More specifically, SUEProb / (1-SUEProb) = exp(-
7.883 + 0.566*FPS + 0.518*ta + 0.982*salegrw + 0.379* return - 0.108*skewness + 
25.635*stdev + 0.00007*turnover), where FPS is an indicator variable for industries that 
belong to biotech (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-5961). ta is total assets of year y; 
salegrw is the sales change from year y-1 to year y scaled by total assets of year y-1; return 
is the 12-month market-adjusted return in year y; and skewness and stdev are the stock-
return skewness and standard deviation in year y. Turnover is trading volume in year y 
scaled by the beginning-of-year y shares outstanding (divided by 1,000). 
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Appendix (Cont’d) 
 
Variable Definition 
Other variables (Cont'd) 
Ln(AT) Natural log of total assets. 
Ln(AGE) Natural log of the number of months since the firm exists in CRSP. 
LOSS 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports a net loss in the current year, and zero 
otherwise.  
MERGER 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition during the 
year, and zero otherwise. 
MKV Natural log of market value of equity. 
MTB The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. 
PPE Net value of property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. 
POWER 
Natural log of one plus the number of financial experts on the audit committee times 
natural log of one plus the number of outside board seats of audit committee members 
deflated by the sum of one plus an indicator variable equal to one if the CFO is on board, 
and zero otherwise. 
RESTRUCTURE 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm has non-zero restructuring costs, and zero 
otherwise. 
RETURN Stock return in the past 12 months. 
RETVOL Standard deviation of monthly stock return in the past 12 months. 
ROA The ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to total assets. 
SALE_G Change in sales divided by sales in the previous year. 
ZSCORE 
Decile rank of Altman's (1968) Z-score to be scaled between zero and one, where Z-score 
is calculated by 0.717× working capital / total assets + 0.847 × retained earnings / total 
assets + 3.107 × earnings before interest and taxes / total assets + 0.42 × book value of 
equity / total liabilities + 0.998 × sales / total assets. The higher the value, the greater the 
bankruptcy risk. 
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Table 1 Sample Description and Univariate Analyses 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  Median Std Q1 Q3 
Sample for accounting restatement (N=9,246)    
RESTAT 0.103 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.000 
TREAT 0.092 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.000 
POST 0.614 1.000 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Ln(AT) 7.560 7.449 1.577 6.458 8.578 
MERGER 0.173 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.000 
FINANCING 0.193 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.000 
BUSSEG 1.151 1.386 0.645 0.693 1.609 
FOREIGN 0.311 0.212 0.332 0.000 0.539 
MTB 2.886 2.192 2.380 1.479 3.395 
LEV 0.201 0.192 0.162 0.041 0.315 
ROA 0.041 0.051 0.097 0.020 0.088 
CURRENT 0.251 0.232 0.160 0.123 0.341 
LOSS 0.166 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.000 
RETVOL 0.026 0.023 0.012 0.017 0.032 
BOARDSIZE 9.140 9.000 1.878 8.000 10.000 
INDEP 0.766 0.778 0.111 0.714 0.846 
INSIDER 0.014 0.003 0.038 0.001 0.009 
Sample for internal control weaknesses (N = 9,239) 
   
ICW_D 0.055 0.000 0.228 0.000 0.000 
Ln(ICW_COUNT) 0.053 0.000 0.244 0.000 0.000 
TREAT 0.089 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.000 
POST 0.763 1.000 0.425 1.000 1.000 
BUSSEG 1.148 1.386 0.647 0.693 1.609 
FOREIGN 0.365 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
MERGER 0.362 0.000 0.481 0.000 1.000 
RESTURCTURE 0.583 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
SALE_G 0.083 0.069 0.196 -0.011 0.155 
INV 0.110 0.082 0.112 0.018 0.163 
MKV 7.687 7.614 1.587 6.584 8.719 
LOSS 0.163 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.000 
ZSCORE 0.507 0.556 0.319 0.222 0.778 
Ln(AGE) 5.590 5.568 0.737 5.106 6.148 
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Pairwise correlation among variables used in regression of accounting restatement 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
RESTAT (1) 
                
POST (2) -0.05 
               
TREAT (3) 0.01 0.00 
              
Ln(AT) (4) -0.04 0.12 0.13 
             
MERGER (5) -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
            
FINANCING (6) 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.22 
           
BUSSEG (7) 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.03 -0.02 
          
FOREIGN (8) -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.02 
         
MTB (9) -0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.10 0.03 
        
LEV (10) 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.10 0.05 -0.14 0.03 
       
ROA (11) -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.25 -0.18 
      
CURRENT (12) 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.05 -0.16 0.02 
     
LOSS (13) 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.21 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.08 -0.71 0.01 
    
RETVOL (14) 0.05 0.21 -0.04 -0.37 -0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.42 0.11 0.45 
   
BOARDSIZE (15) -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.51 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.21 
  
INDEPENDNET (16) -0.03 0.25 -0.03 0.18 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.17 
 
INSIDER (17) 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.15 -0.19 
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Pairwise correlation among variables used in regressions of internal control quality 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
ICW_D (1) 
             
Ln(ICW_COUNT) (2) 0.91 
            
POST (3) -0.16 -0.16 
           
TREAT (4) 0.01 0.02 0.00 
          
BUSSEG (5) 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
         
FOREIGN (6) 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.05 
        
MERGER (7) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.07 
       
RESTRUCTURE (8) 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.21 0.08 
      
SALE_G (9) 0.01 0.00 -0.19 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.16 -0.14 
     
INV (10) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 
    
MKV (11) -0.14 -0.13 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.17 
   
LOSS (12) 0.12 0.12 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.16 -0.22 0.02 -0.36 
  
ZSCORE (13) -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.13 0.18 0.10 0.13 -0.34 
 
Ln(AGE) (14) -0.07 -0.06 0.16 0.02 0.16 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 -0.14 0.01 0.26 -0.09 -0.12 
 
Panel D: Univariate analysis of the effect of CFO pay disclosure on accounting restatement and 
internal control quality 
 
  
Variable 
Pre-2006 -rule 
(POST=0) 
Post-2006-rule 
(POST=1) 
Difference 
(Difference-in-
differences) 
Treatment firms 
RESTAT 0.153  0.083 0.071 *** 
ICW_D 0.169  0.026 0.144 *** 
Ln(ICW_COUNT) 0.200  0.028 0.173 *** 
Control firms 
RESTAT 0.115   0.094 0.021 *** 
ICW_D 0.115  0.036 0.079 *** 
Ln(ICW_COUNT) 0.111   0.034 0.077 *** 
Difference 
(Difference-in-
differences) 
RESTAT 0.038 ** -0.012 0.050 ** 
ICW_D 0.054 * -0.010 0.065 ** 
Ln(ICW_COUNT) 0.089 ** -0.006 0.096 ** 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for measures of accounting restatement, internal control quality, and control 
variables. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in regressions; Panels B and C present the 
pairwise correlations among variables in the regression of accounting restatement and internal control quality, 
respectively; Panel D compares the mean accounting restatements and internal control quality in the pre- and post-
2006-rule periods for treatment and control firms, respectively. A correlation coefficient in boldface indicates a 
significance level of 0.05 or lower using two-tailed tests. Two-sample t-tests are used to test the differences in means. 
*** indicates a significance level at 0.01. All variables are defined in Appendix. 
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Table 2 Effect of CFO Pay Disclosure on CFOs’ Performance in Accounting Restatement 
 
  Dependent var. = RESTAT 
TREAT 0.387* 
 (1.96) 
POST -0.246*** 
 (-2.79) 
TREAT×POST -0.657** 
 (-2.38) 
Ln(AT) -0.066* 
 (-1.67) 
MERGER -0.079 
 (-0.77) 
FINANCING 0.158* 
 (1.71) 
BUSSEG 0.183** 
 (2.40) 
FOREIGN 0.122 
 (0.77) 
MTB -0.082*** 
 (-3.68) 
LEV 0.907*** 
 (2.95) 
ROA 0.014 
 (0.03) 
CURRENT 0.215 
 (0.56) 
LOSS 0.320** 
 (2.33) 
RETVOL 1.571 
 (0.42) 
BOARDSIZE -0.046 
 (-1.54) 
INDEPENDENT -0.242 
 (-0.61) 
INSIDER 0.562 
 (0.56) 
Constant -2.165*** 
 (-2.93) 
  
Observations 9,246 
Industry FE Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.038 
 
This table presents the logit regression result of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ performance measured 
by accounting restatement. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firms. *, **, 
*** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix.  
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Table 3 Effect of CFO Pay Disclosure on CFOs’ Performance in Internal Control Quality 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent var. = ICW_D Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
TREAT 0.738*** 0.185*** 
 (2.89) (3.01) 
POST -1.505*** -0.084*** 
 (-12.53) (-8.79) 
TREAT×POST -1.127*** -0.178*** 
 (-3.02) (-2.96) 
BUSSEG 0.378*** 0.018*** 
 (3.11) (3.10) 
FOREIGN 0.432*** 0.025*** 
 (3.10) (2.87) 
MERGER -0.084 -0.013** 
 (-0.67) (-2.03) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.034 -0.007 
 (0.25) (-1.08) 
SALE_G 0.471* 0.008 
 (1.79) (0.51) 
INV 1.184 0.074 
 (1.39) (1.30) 
MKV -0.421*** -0.017*** 
 (-8.19) (-6.07) 
LOSS 0.528*** 0.050*** 
 (3.53) (3.96) 
ZSCORE -0.722*** -0.055*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.92) 
Ln(AGE) -0.077 -0.002 
 (-0.85) (-0.41) 
Constant -11.076*** 0.298*** 
 (-13.44) (4.22) 
   
Observations 9,239 9,239 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.172 0.075 
 
This table presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ performance in internal control 
quality. Logit regression is used when the dependent variable is ICW_D; OLS estimation is used when the dependent 
variable is Ln(ICW_COUNT). The t-statistics (z-statistics) are reported in parentheses for OLS (logit) regressions. 
Standard errors are clustered by firms. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix. 
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Table 4 Effect of CFO Pay Disclosure on CFOs’ Performance for the Propensity-Score-
Matched Sample 
 
Panel A: Estimation of the probability of being a treatment firm 
  Dependent var. = TREAT 
  
Ln(SALE) 0.420*** 
 (3.43) 
MTB 0.019 
 (0.33) 
LEV -0.696 
 (-0.69) 
ROA 2.576 
 (1.07) 
RETVOL -18.278 
 (-0.66) 
RETURN 0.096 
 (0.18) 
INST -0.379 
 (-0.89) 
BOARDSIZE 0.051 
 (0.69) 
INDEPENDENT -2.184** 
 (-2.31) 
DUAL_D -0.391 
 (-1.44) 
Constant -15.851 
 (-0.02) 
  
Observations 1,183 
Industry FE Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.128 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Effect of CFO pay disclosure on accounting restatement for the PSM sample 
  Dependent var. = RESTAT 
TREAT 0.365 
 (1.12) 
POST 0.084 
 (0.28) 
TREAT×POST -0.792** 
 (-1.97) 
Ln(AT) -0.114 
 (-1.22) 
MERGER 0.167 
 (0.58) 
FINANCING 0.456 
 (1.63) 
BUSSEG 0.126 
 (0.68) 
FOREIGN 0.137 
 (0.31) 
MTB -0.154** 
 (-2.22) 
LEV 0.542 
 (0.51) 
ROA 1.348 
 (0.71) 
CURRENT 0.582 
 (0.57) 
LOSS 0.315 
 (0.84) 
RETVOL 2.614 
 (0.25) 
BOARDSIZE 0.116 
 (1.52) 
INDEPENDENT -2.314** 
 (-2.45) 
INSIDER -0.945 
 (-0.51) 
Constant -1.570 
 (-1.11) 
Observations 1,415 
Industry FE Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.086 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Effect of CFO pay disclosure on internal control quality for the PSM sample 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent var. = ICW_D Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
TREAT 0.632 0.036 
 (1.42) (1.56) 
POST -1.443*** -0.017 
 (-3.80) (-1.17) 
TREAT×POST -1.191* -0.040* 
 (-1.85) (-1.69) 
BUSSEG 0.210 -0.010* 
 (0.74) (-1.86) 
FOREIGN 0.167 -0.003 
 (0.38) (-0.28) 
MERGER 0.005 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.49) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.260 0.002 
 (0.58) (0.29) 
SALE_G 2.641** 0.022 
 (1.98) (1.01) 
INV -3.691 -0.105* 
 (-1.21) (-1.96) 
MKV -0.568*** -0.007** 
 (-4.68) (-2.47) 
LOSS 0.917** 0.030* 
 (2.04) (1.68) 
ZSCORE -1.304** -0.010 
 (-2.14) (-0.77) 
Ln(AGE) 0.175 -0.003 
 (0.61) (-0.71) 
Constant 1.042 0.132*** 
 (0.54) (2.80) 
   
Observations 1,353 1,353 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.293 0.075 
 
This table presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ performance for the 
propensity-score-matched sample. Panel A presents the regression result of a logit model for the probability of being 
a treatment firm, used to obtain the propensity scores; Panel B presents the regression result of the effects of CFO pay 
disclosure on accounting restatement; Panel C presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on 
internal control quality. Logit regression is used when the dependent variable is RESTAT or ICW_D; OLS estimation 
is used when the dependent variable is Ln(ICW_COUNT). The t-statistics (z-statistics) are reported in parentheses for 
OLS (logit) regressions. Standard errors are clustered by firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix.   
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Table 5 Effect of CFO Pay Disclosure on CFOs’ Performance based on Alternative Control 
Firms 
 
Panel A: Effect of CFO pay disclosure on accounting restatement 
  Dependent var. = RESTAT 
 
Subsample of treatment firms and alternative control 
firms 
TREAT 0.480** 
 (2.01) 
POST -0.127 
 (-0.71) 
TREAT×POST -0.800** 
 (-2.51) 
Constant -14.135*** 
 (-11.29) 
Observations 2,337 
Control var. Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.071 
 
Panel B: Effect of CFO pay disclosure on internal control quality 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent var. = ICW_D Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
 Subsample of treatment firms and alternative control firms 
TREAT 0.186*** 0.790*** 
 
(2.94) (2.65) 
POST -0.082*** -1.359*** 
 
(-4.00) (-6.33) 
TREAT×POST -0.188*** -1.261*** 
 
(-2.98) (-3.02) 
Constant 0.100 -11.351*** 
 (1.53) (-7.22) 
Observations 2,316 2,316 
Control var. Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.083 0.171 
 
This table presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ performance for a subsample 
of treatment firms and control firms whose CFOs are the lowest paid among the four non-CEO executives before 2006. 
Panel A presents the regression result of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on accounting restatement; Panel B presents 
the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on internal control quality. Logit regression is used when 
the dependent variable is RESTAT or ICW_D; OLS estimation is used when the dependent variable is 
Ln(ICW_COUNT). The t-statistics (z-statistics) are reported in parentheses for OLS (logit) regressions. Standard errors 
are clustered by firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix 
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Table 6 Descriptive on the Number of Performance Measures in CFO Compensation 
Contracts 
 
  Post-2006-rule period 
Mean number of 
performance measures 
Mean number of 
financial measures 
Treatment firms N=51 3.216 2.373 
Control firms N=42 2.548 2.143 
Difference  0.668* 0.230* 
 
This table presents the descriptive summary on the number of performance measures adopted in CFOs’ compensation 
contracts for treatment and control firms separately in the post-2006 period. We focus on firms that explicitly discuss 
performance measures applicable to CFOs in their proxy statements. Two-sample t-tests are used to test the differences 
in means. * indicates a significance level at 0.10. 
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Table 7 Effect of CFO Pay Disclosure on CFOs’ Performance for Treatment Firms without 
CFO Turnovers 
 
Panel A: Effect of CFO pay disclosure on accounting restatement 
  Dependent var. = RESTAT 
 treatment firms without CFO turnovers 
TREAT 0.198 
 (0.81) 
POST -0.246*** 
 (-2.77) 
TREAT×POST -0.625* 
 (-1.74) 
Constant -2.215*** 
 (-3.00) 
Observations 8,900 
Control var. Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.039 
 
Panel B: Effect of CFO pay disclosure on internal control quality  
  (1) (2) 
Dependent var. = ICW_D Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
 treatment firms without CFO turnovers 
TREAT 0.541 0.120 
 (1.60) (1.54) 
POST -1.504*** -0.119*** 
 (-12.50) (-10.33) 
TREAT×POST -1.857*** -0.127* 
 (-2.70) (-1.60) 
Constant -11.589*** 0.432*** 
 (-13.52) (5.26) 
Observations 8,907 8,907 
Control var.  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.171 0.105 
 
This table presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ performance for treatment 
firms without CFO turnovers. Panel A presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on 
accounting restatement; Panel B presents the regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on internal control 
quality. Logit regression is used when the dependent variable is RESTAT or ICW_D; OLS estimation is used when the 
dependent variable is Ln(ICW_COUNT). The t-statistics (z-statistics) are reported in parentheses for OLS (logit) 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered by firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix. 
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Table 8 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 
Panel A: Cross-sectional analyses of accounting restatement 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent var. = RESTAT 
 Young 
CFO 
Old CFO 
Weak audit 
committee 
Strong 
audit 
committee 
High 
litigation 
risk 
Low 
litigation 
risk 
TREAT 0.375 0.332 0.356 0.427 0.451* 0.430 
 (1.14) (0.60) (1.52) (1.14) (1.76) (1.36) 
POST -0.312* -0.101 -0.328*** -0.203 -0.388*** -0.175 
 (-1.66) (-0.66) (-2.69) (-1.48) (-2.89) (-1.40) 
TREAT×POST -1.507*** 0.085 -0.731** -0.558 -0.741** -0.439 
 (-2.85) (0.17) (-2.06) (-1.18) (-2.06) (-1.01) 
Constant -1.398* -13.437*** -2.481*** -13.739*** -12.759*** -2.856*** 
 (-1.84) (-11.22) (-3.15) (-11.76) (-10.96) (-3.30) 
Observations 2,769 2,952 4,562 4,684 4,607 4,639 
Control var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.062 0.043 0.055 0.063 0.045 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional analyses of internal control quality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent var. = Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
 Young 
CFO 
Old CFO 
Weak audit 
committee 
Strong 
audit 
committee 
High 
litigation 
risk 
Low 
litigation 
risk 
TREAT 0.167** 0.058 0.163** 0.004 0.123* 0.044 
 
(2.22) (1.39) (2.10) (0.20) (1.86) (1.15) 
POST -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.102*** -0.036*** -0.079*** -0.060*** 
 
(-3.79) (-4.11) (-6.78) (-5.61) (-6.09) (-6.07) 
TREAT×POST -0.162** -0.065 -0.173** -0.008 -0.113* -0.047 
 
(-2.18) (-1.47) (-2.19) (-0.37) (-1.74) (-1.19) 
Constant 0.220*** 0.256*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.384*** 0.153*** 
 
(4.91) (3.95) (4.35) (7.62) (6.89) (4.02) 
Observations 2,769 2,953 4,640 4,599 4,676 4,563 
Control var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.059 0.054 0.076 0.035 0.063 0.051 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional variation in the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFOs’ performance. Panel A 
presents the cross-sectional variation in the effects of CFO pay disclosure on accounting restatement; Panel B presents 
the cross-sectional variation in the effects of CFO pay disclosure on internal control quality. In Columns (1) and (2), 
the sample is partitioned at the median value of firms’ mean CFO age; in Columns (3) and (4), the sample is partitioned 
at the median value of firms’ mean power of the audit committee relative to that of CFO (POWER); in Columns (5) 
and (6), the sample is partitioned at the median value of firms’ average litigation risk (LITIGATION). Logit regression 
is used when the dependent variable is RESTAT; OLS estimation is used when the dependent variable is 
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Ln(ICW_COUNT). The t-statistics (z-statistics) are reported in parentheses for OLS (logit) regressions. Standard errors 
are clustered by firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix. 
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Table 9 Dynamic Analysis 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent var. =  RESTAT Ln(ICW_COUNT) 
TREAT 0.458** 0.189*** 
 (2.07) (2.65) 
POST-1 0.056 -0.046*** 
 (0.48) (-3.93) 
POST0 -0.200 -0.078*** 
 (-1.55) (-5.92) 
POST1 -0.473*** -0.097*** 
 (-3.25) (-7.34) 
POST2 -0.477*** -0.132*** 
 (-2.91) (-9.13) 
POST3+ -0.158 -0.115*** 
 (-1.35) (-8.77) 
TREAT×POST-1 -0.136 -0.007 
 (-0.39) (-0.12) 
TREAT×POST0 -0.757* -0.141* 
 (-1.84) (-1.93) 
TREAT×POST1 -0.359 -0.178** 
 (-0.80) (-2.46) 
TREAT×POST2 -1.819** -0.205*** 
 (-2.44) (-2.81) 
TREAT×POST3+ -0.620* -0.187** 
 (-1.78) (-2.54) 
Constant -2.065*** 0.317*** 
 (-2.77) (4.42) 
Observations 9,246 9,239 
Control var. Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.049 0.081 
 
This table presents the regression results of the dynamic analysis of CFO pay disclosure on CFO performance. POST-
1 equals one for fiscal years that end between Dec. 15, 2005, and Dec. 15, 2006, and zero otherwise; POST0 (POST1, 
POST2) equals one for fiscal years that end between Dec. 15, 2006 (2007, 2008), and Dec. 15, 2007 (2008, 2009), and 
zero otherwise; POST3+ equals one for fiscal years that end after Dec. 15, 2009, and zero otherwise. Logit regression 
is used when the dependent variable is RESTAT; OLS estimation is used when the dependent variable is 
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Ln(ICW_COUNT). The t-statistics (z-statistics) are reported in parentheses for OLS (logit) regressions. Standard errors 
are clustered by firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix. 
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Table 10 Effect of CFO Pay Disclosure on CFOs’ Performance in Accruals Quality 
 
Dependent var. = |DA| 
TREAT 0.004* 
 (1.77) 
POST -0.003*** 
 (-3.66) 
TREAT×POST -0.004** 
 (-2.03) 
Ln(AT) -0.001** 
 (-1.97) 
CFVOL 0.200*** 
 (14.43) 
SALEVOL 0.045*** 
 (11.07) 
CYCLE -0.005*** 
 (-3.05) 
LOSS 0.015*** 
 (8.78) 
SALE_G 0.006*** 
 (4.61) 
RETURN 0.002** 
 (2.29) 
Constant 0.017*** 
 (6.35) 
Observations 8,218 
Industry FE Yes 
Adj. R2 0.281 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the effects of CFO pay disclosure on CFO performance measured by 
absolute discretionary accruals. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses for OLS regressions. Standard errors are 
clustered by firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix. 
 
